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with and without one of two kinds of pre-play communication: numerical (tabular) only, 
and verbal and numerical. We find that either kind of pre-play communication increases 
trusting, trustworthiness, or both, in inter-subject comparisons, but that the inclusion of 
verbal communication generates both a larger effect and one that is robust across both 
inter-subject and intra-subject comparisons. In all conditions, trustors earn more when 
they invest more of their endowment, trustors and trustees gravitate to “fair and efficient” 
interactions, and the majority of trustees adhere to their commitments, whether explicit or 
implicit. Finally, we study trusting and trustworthiness in the sense of adhering to 
agreements, and we find that both are enhanced when the parties can use words, and 
especially when an agreement is reached with words and not only with the exchange of 
numerical proposals. 
 
Keywords: trust game, trust, trustworthiness, reciprocity, 
commitment, communication, cheap talk. 
 
JEL codes: C72, C91, D63  
 
                                                 
1.The research reported here was funded by a grant from the Russell Sage Foundation.  We are indebted to 
Freyr Halldorsson for help in planning and carrying out the experiments, and Bruno Garcia for help in 
coding chat content.  
* Industrial Relations Center, University of Minnesota. 
+ Department of Economics, Brown University.   2
Lavish Returns on Cheap Talk: Non-binding 




In much of economic life, individuals, firms, and organizations carry out 
transactions in ways that, because they lack simultaneity and low-cost enforceability, 
require the trust of one party and the trustworthiness of another.  The trust or investment 
game (Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, 1995, hereafter BDM) has been a popular tool for 
the study of these behaviors.  In this game one agent, the “trustor” (A), can send some or 
none of an endowment provided by the experimenter to another agent, the “trustee” (B), 
who receives triple the amount sent.  B can then return some or none of what he or she 
received to A.  Returning money has been interpreted as showing trustworthiness, sending 
money as showing trust that B will share the gains.   
One aspect of the emergence of trust and trustworthiness that has been largely 
absent in these experiments is the possibility of communication between the parties.  
Without prior communication, the status of A’s sending as an indication of trusting and of 
B’s returning as representing a reciprocation of trust depends upon the interpretation of 
the researcher (Camerer, 2003).  If the parties have the opportunity to reach an 
understanding before the interaction, in contrast, then the status of their subsequent 
actions as tests of trust and trustworthiness is much clearer.  When player B, for instance, 
proceeds to diminish her earnings by adhering to a pre-play agreement, the interpretation 
that B is being trustworthy is immediate.   
In the real world, a look in the eye and a handshake may provide valued assurance 
even when formal enforcement is unavailable, and a face-to-face meeting may be 
considered indispensable for sizing up the character of the other party.  Whether less 
intimate channels of communication can serve the same purpose is an interesting question 
that this paper will help to address.   
  In other settings, experimentalists have found evidence that pre-play 
communication, although not binding, can have large effects on behavior.  While the trust 
game literature has grown to include dozens of papers, however, none that we are aware 
of include opportunities for pre-play communication by both trustor and trustee.  In a 
companion paper (Ben-Ner and Putterman, 2007), we let subjects in some trust games   3
exchange pre-play messages, then gave them the opportunity to enter into contracts if 
they reached agreements.  In those experiments, we found that pre-play communication 
increased both trusting (sending by A) and trustworthiness (the proportion of money 
returned by B), and that the large majority of interactions were carried out without 
contracts.  Because we can’t rule out the possibility that the opportunity to enter a 
contract influenced those results, however, we conduct and report here otherwise similar 
experiments in which contracts make no appearance.  Our new experiments also allow 
both between-subject and within –subject comparisons, controlling possible order effects.   
  On a practical level, our results have bearing on matters of considerable economic 
importance.  As is often remarked and as is demonstrated experimentally in Ben-Ner and 
Putterman (2007), trust and trustworthiness can serve as cost-saving alternatives to 
written contracts and enforcement mechanisms.  Businesses, independent contractors, 
government decision-makers, and participants in a wide range of private exchanges invest 
substantial amounts of time and resources to gauge one another’s commitment and 
trustworthiness through face-to-face, written, telephone, and other forms of 
communication.  The roles played by different aspects of these interactions, such as body 
language, tone of voice, vocabulary, etc., remain considerably under-explored.  Our 
results suggest that verbal communication increases the likelihood of reaching agreement, 
raises trusting, and increases trustworthiness, and that the exchange of a few written 
words, with no visual or auditory contact, can have a substantial effect.  Content analysis 
shows that A’s sent more and that B’s returned a proportion more closely approximating 
A’s suggestion when the two had verbally agreed on a course of action than when they 
had only a numerical agreement or no agreement at all.  In addition, B’s who provided 
explicit verbal assurances to their partners were on average more trustworthy, implying 
real self-commitment.   
  While contributing a new dimension to the literature on communication, our paper 
also adds to insights about trust and social preferences.  Our finding of a high frequency 
of trustee returning of money to trustors adds to the evidence of preferences and beliefs 
associated with reciprocity (Fehr and Gächter, 2000b).  Our subjects’ marked gravitation 
to fair exchanges adds to evidence of fairness preferences.  Our results add to the 
evidence that agents are capable of committing themselves to actions that are payoff-  4
reducing, and that such abilities to commit are widely believed by others to be common 
(Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006, Gneezy, 2005).  And our findings are suggestive of a 
considerable framing or presentation effect associated with the decision grid which we 
introduce to facilitate pre-play communication and decision-making.   
  The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we briefly discuss trust and 
communication with references to the recent literature. In Section 3, we give details about 
our experimental design. Section 4 discusses our findings, and Section 5 concludes the 
paper. 
 
2. Trust and Communication  
  We say that A trusts B when A chooses to engage with B in an interaction that has 
the potential to benefit A, but that would end up harming A were B to respond in a purely 
self-interested fashion.  A manifests trust by making himself vulnerable to B’s response in 
the hope or expectation that B will act at least in part with A’s interest in mind.
2   
In a trust or investment game in which partners interact only once, are 
anonymous, and cannot acquire reputations, the prediction of economic theory assuming 
rational, payoff-maximizing actors who know other actors to be of this type is 
unambiguous.  B has no incentive to give money to A, no matter how generous A may 
have been.  Because B will never return any money, A will never send any.  Returning by 
B’s violates either rationality or strict self-interest or both.  Sending by A’s need not 
violate either rationality or self-interest if A’s have reason to believe that some B’s are 
irrational or have a non-selfish preference, for instance reciprocity (Hoffman, McCabe 
and Smith, 1998; Fehr and Gächter, 2000a; Ben-Ner and Putterman, 2000).  In the trust 
game, we call A “more trusting” when A sends a larger part of her available endowment 
to B. 
We note that to view A’s sending of money to B as trusting, in the simple trust 
game with standard instructions, is to add an interpretive gloss that may or may not be 
justified.  Cox (2004) has pointed out that A’s trust, in the sense just described, could well 
                                                 
2 “To say ‘A trusts B’ means that A expects B will not exploit a vulnerability A has created for himself by 
taking the action (James, 2002).”  If A entered the relationship with the sole aim of aiding B, A’s act would 
be one of altruism, not trust.  If A “trusts” B because A knows that B has (selfish) incentives to do what is in 
the interest of A, this also fails to satisfy our definition.  For similar definitions, see Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 
2004, Eckel and Wilson, 2004, and Ben-Ner and Putterman, 2001.   5
be confounded with altruism toward B.
3  How B views A’s action is also not 
unambiguously revealed by B’s decision.  What, if anything, B returns to A could, for 
instance, reflect only B’s distributive preferences.  We use the terms trusting and 
trustworthy to describe the acts of sending and returning, respectively, but bear these 
caveats in mind. We also note that a pre-play exchange of messages can make the 
application of the terms trust and trustworthiness more direct, if it results in an explicit 
framing of the interaction in those terms by the communicators and/or in agreement on a 
course of action.  Thus, in addition to studying how communication influences the 
amount of money sent by A and the proportion returned by B, we also study how 
communication influences trusting and trustworthiness in the sense of A’s and B’s 
adherence to agreements. 
  But how, if at all, can communicating before acting be expected to alter trust 
game outcomes, as opposed to our interpretation of them?  In standard economic theory, 
which assumes strictly self-interested agents, pre-play communication can have no effect.  
If all agents are rational payoff maximizers and have common knowledge of this, they 
have no incentive to even send meaningful messages, since it’s clear that no message can 
change B’s incentive to return nothing, hence A’s incentive to send nothing.  If A’s are 
self-interested but believe that their counterparts may have other preferences, however, 
they might use communication to gauge the type of a specific counterpart, then rationally 
send positive amounts upon receiving certain kinds of response.  Payoff-maximizing B’s 
will never return money in one-shot interactions without reputational implications, but a 
payoff-maximizing B who believes that his counterpart believes that some B’s are 
reciprocators or inequality-averse may attempt to use communication to signal that he is 
of the relevant type.  If such communication raises A’s expectations that she faces a 
partner with such preferences, it can affect A’s sending behavior.  Pre-play 
communication might also raise both sending and returning if partners actually have 
preferences for adhering to their agreements (disutility from promise-breaking), suffer 
                                                 
3 This is especially the case, in our view, in variants of the trust game in which only A is provided with an 
endowment.  Examples include Glaeser et al. (2000), Malhotra and Murnighan (2002) and Schotter and 
Sopher (2006).   6
guilt from letting a partner down,
4 or have dispositions towards reciprocity that are 
activated by certain social cues.   
  Ultimately, whether communication increases trust and/or trustworthiness is an 
empirical question.  Because few experiments have permitted communication in the trust 
game, we briefly consider communication in other experimental settings.  A survey 
focusing mainly on games of coordination is provided by Crawford (1998), who finds 
that communication sometimes increases efficiency when players’ interests are partially 
aligned.  Crawford writes from the standpoint of traditional theory, which assumes that 
the message “Sender does not find lying personally costly” and “cannot commit himself 
to tell the truth” (p. 287).
5   
  Because our experimental results will be difficult to explain without violating the 
latter assumption, the growing body of evidence of communication effects in positive-
sum games is of particular interest to us.  In these games, the conflicting interests of the 
players cannot be overcome without non-standard preferences such as reciprocity, 
inequity aversion, or aversion to lying.  Public goods experiments, which highlight the 
potential for conflict between individual and collective interests, are probably the best 
represented games of this kind in the literature.  In such experiments, face-to-face 
communication has been found to be one of the most powerful ways of increasing 
cooperation. Isaac and Walker (1988) found that pre-play communication led their 
experimental subjects to contribute considerably more to a public good, a result strongly 
reconfirmed by Brosig et al. (2003) and Bochet et al. (2006). Ostrom, Walker and 
Gardner (1992) found similar results in common pool resource experiments. Isaac and 
Walker’s is one of 37 papers with 130 experimental treatments whose results Sally 
(1995) entered in multivariate regressions to study which treatment variables best account 
for differing levels of cooperation and free riding in public goods games. Sally concluded 
                                                 
4 Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) posit that B’s may return money when they promise to do so not 
because they suffer disutility from lying, but because they anticipate guilt from failing their partners’ 
expectations of them and believe that their protestations of good faith are likely to have raised those 
expectations. 
5 An accessible survey of theoretical literature on communication is Farrell and Rabin (1996).  The authors 
argue in favor of the common sense assumption that people take their own and others’ messages seriously 
when there is no particular reason not to, judging that “babbling” equilibria are in these circumstances 
formally possible but “weird.” Apart from some footnotes from which we will quote in our conclusion, 
however, they nevertheless limit their discussion to the assumption of actors incapable of self-commitment.   7
that face-to-face communication was the single strongest of the treatment variables 
studied.    
  A problem with interpreting the impact of face-to-face communication is that it 
adds a number of potentially separable elements to treatments involving subject 
anonymity and absence of communication, making it difficult to know what accounts for 
its influence. When subjects communicate face to face, anonymity is lost, which 
introduces the possible influence of identity (one learns the counterpart’s gender, race, 
height, etc.). Concerns about possible post-interaction reward or punishment can also 
arise. Psychological costs may arise as well: a subject may feel greater obligation to trust, 
or to be trustworthy towards, a concrete other. Face-to-face meetings also make possible 
verbal communication, in which promises can be delivered. Commitment, sympathy, and 
other emotions can be conveyed by vocal intonation, facial expression, and body 
language.  Interpersonal attraction, aversion, or bonding may result from physical 
proximity.   
To understand better what lies behind the effects of face-to-face communication, 
Brosig et al. and Bochet et al. conducted voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) 
experiments in which other forms of communication were in some conditions substituted 
for face-to-face discussion.  Brosig et al.’s comparison treatments included a no-
communication baseline, a treatment with audio and visual communication from 
separated compartments, a treatment with only audio communication from separated 
compartments, and a treatment in which subjects could view one another on video 
terminals but could not communicate, prior to making their decisions.  Bochet et al.’s 
comparison treatments also included one without communication, with the other two 
being a numerical communication and a chat room communication treatment.
6  Of these 
treatments, Brosig et al.’s audio + video treatment approached the effectiveness of face-
                                                 
6 Bochet et al.’s chat room treatment resembles Frohlich and Oppenheimer’s (1998) VCM in which group 
members could communicate with e-mail messages, while their non-binding numerical communication 
treatment, which they labeled “numerical cheap talk,” resembles the numerical pre-announcement 
treatment of Wilson and Sell (1997), except that subjects in Bochet et al. could react to one another’s 
announcements with new non-binding announcements for a period of a minute or longer before making 
binding decisions, whereas Wilson and Sell’s subjects could send only one announcement before each 
binding decision. Bochet et al. also included comparison treatments in which group members could impose 
costly monetary punishment on one another, as in Fehr and Gächter (2000a). We ignore these in our 
discussion.   8
to-face communication most closely, followed by Bochet et al.’s chat room treatment.  
Bochet et al.’s numerical communication treatment, in which subjects sent members of 
their group non-binding possible contribution choices but no verbal messages, produced 
roughly the same average behavior as the no-communication baseline but led to a higher 
dispersion among groups, indicating that it enhanced cooperation in some groups and 
worsened outcomes in others.  Bochet and Putterman (forthcoming) show that most 
subjects in the treatment responded to one another’s signals in a manner consistent with 
attempting to signal true intentions.   
Other experiments in which reciprocity or cooperative intentions seem to interact 
with inclinations toward truth-telling include Ellingsen, Johannesson, Lilja and 
Zetterqvist (2006), and Lundquist, Ellingsen, Gribbe and Johannesson (2007).  Lunquist 
et al. Study the effect of cheap talk in a bargaining game with one-sided asymmetric 
information.  Comparing a no information treatment with three types of communication, 
they find that allowing freely formulated messages leads to the fewest lies and the most 
efficient outcomes.  They interpret their results as suggesting “that lying about private 
information is [subjectively] costly and that the cost of lying increases with the size of the 
lie and the strength of the promise.  Ellingsen et al. Study the correlation between subject 
type and truth-telling by having subjects play in the same pairs first a prisoners’ dilemma 
game and then private values bargaining game with communication.  Communication 
increases efficiency among subjects who cooperated in the prisoners’ dilemma, but has 
no effect for other subjects.  In another experiment finding a correlation between 
cooperativeness and truth-telling, Sanchez-Pages and Vorsatz (2007) study two sender-
receiver games in which a sender can tell the truth, lie, or remain silent, and in one of 
which, the receiver can engage in costly punishment of the sender after learning whether 
the information was truthful.  A correlation between negative reciprocity and truth-telling 
is found by the fact that “those subjects who punish the sender with a high probability 
after being deceived are precisely those who send fewer but more truthful messages.”   
  There have been fewer experiments with pre-play communication in trust games, 
and none in which both parties could exchange proposals or verbal messages. Malhotra 
and Murnighan (2002) had a computer program posing as trustee sometimes propose a 
non-binding contract for mutual cooperation, and found that trustors who agreed to such a   9
contract sent more to their “counterpart.”  Glaeser, Laibson, Sheinkman and Soutter 
(2000) and Buchan, Croson and Johnson (2006) allowed subjects to meet and engage in 
communication before playing trust games, but these were manipulations of social 
distance prior to informing subjects of their decision task.  Buchan et al. permitted no 
task-relevant communication, while Glaeser et al.let some trustees choose to send, or not, 
a message promising to return at least as much as their partner had sent.  Fehr and List 
(2004), Fehr and Rockenbach (2003), Houser, Xiao, McCabe and Smith (forthcoming) 
and Rigdon (2005) conducted games in which trustors could suggest amounts to be 
returned by their trustee counterparts and in some conditions threaten punishment should 
they not do so. Rigdon’s subjects could reject or accept proposals. In none of the 
treatments listed is communication fully two-sided, and the papers describing 
experiments with pre-play suggestions focus mainly on the effects of threatening or not 
threatening punishment, rather than on the effects of different proposal terms.  Charness 
and Dufwenberg (2006) permit either trustor or trustee, but not both, to send a single 
message in a binary trust game. They find that the amounts of both trusting and 
trustworthiness increase significantly when trustees can send messages, but are not 
influenced by letting trustors send them.   
 
3. Experimental Design and Predictions 
  We conducted an experiment in each session of which a subject, randomly 
assigned either role A or role B for all interactions, engages in 10 trust game interactions, 
each with a different anonymous partner seated in a different building.  In each 
interaction, both A and B begin with 10 units of experimental currency labeled 
experimental dollars (E$), A selects XA   (0,1,…10), B receives 3XA, and B selects  0 ≤ 
XB ≤ 3XA to return to A, yielding payoffs (10 - XA + XB, 10 + 3XA - XB)—precisely the 
moves and payoffs studied by BDM.  A slight modification of the BDM procedure is that 
rather than selecting XB from all integers in the relevant range, B selects a fraction FB   
(0, 1/6, 1/3, ½, 2/3, 5/6, 1), and XB = FB·3XA.
7   A’s options were displayed as row 
                                                 
7 Thus, as in BDM, the range of B’s potential earnings, from 10 to 40, differs from that of A, which is from 
0 to 30.  This differs from some experiments that depart from BDM by permitting B to send all or part of 
his endowment, as well as money received from A, and from experiments in which B receives no 
endowment.   10
headings and B’s as column headings in a table appearing on the computer screens of 
both players (Figure 1).  Each cell lists the resulting value of XB, above, and the resulting 
final earnings pair (YA, YB), below.  Final decisions were made by A first clicking on a 
row, which became highlighted on both screens, then B clicking on a column, which was 
likewise highlighted.  At the end of the session, subjects were paid 10 cents per E$1 plus 
a flat $10 for completing a 30 – 45 minute pre-laboratory sign-up survey and the 30 
minute laboratory experiment.
8  Earnings in the laboratory portion averaged $20.74. 
  Our focus is on the effect of opportunities to engage in non-binding 
communication of two possible types: one in which messages can contain numerical (i.e., 
row and column) information about possible courses of action but no verbal information, 
such as suggestions, pledges, inquiries, or small talk; and the other in which both verbal 
and numerical information can be exchanged.  Interactions with no pre-play 
communication were also conducted for purposes of comparison. 
  More specifically, what we call simple (S) interactions have only the two steps 
(1) A selects XA by clicking on a row of the table, which is thereby highlighted on both 
subjects’ screens, and (2) B selects FB by clicking on a column.  In single proposal (SP) 
interactions, A first clicked-and-highlighted both a row and a column, described in the 
instructions as a proposal; then B clicked-and-highlighted either the same or a different 
row and column, also described as making a proposal, which might or might not agree 
with A’s.  Subjects were told that these actions had no direct effect on payments.
 9  Then 
A chose any row and B chose any column, as in a simple interaction.   In chat plus single 
proposal (CSP) interactions, A and B could exchange text messages in a private chat 
room for one minute, then went through the same procedures as single proposal.  
Messages could not reveal one’s identity or contain threats or promises except regarding 
permissible game moves.
10     
                                                 
8 Subjects were told that the laboratory portion would take up to one hour.  The survey produced data on 
personal background and characteristics that we plan to use in conjunction with the experiment decisions in 
other research.  The pre-laboratory portion was completed between a week and two days before the lab 
portion, and included a set of lottery choices that determined a small portion of earnings and are used by us 
elsewhere as a measure of risk-aversion.    
9 A variant of single proposal with up to three proposals and counter-proposals was used in a related 
experiment; we retain the single proposal terminology here even though the distinction isn’t needed for 
purposes of this paper. 
10 Subjects were told they would forfeit all earnings if they violated these rules.  A review of the chat 
messages shows no violations.   11
  We study five session designs to investigate the effects of communication both by 
inter-subject and by intra-subject comparisons, while for purposes of the latter controlling 
for order effects.  In S-SP, each subject engaged in five interactions (each with a different 
partner) with no communication, then five interactions with only numerical proposals.  In 
SP-S, this order is reversed, with each subject engaging in five SP interactions and then 
five S interactions.  In S-CSP, five simple interactions are followed by five interactions 
with chat and single proposal.  CSP-S reverses this order.  We carried out also an SP-
CSP treatment with five SP interactions followed by five CSP interactions, but due to 
resource limitations, we did not also reverse that order.  Note that subjects were not 
informed in advance of the exact number of interactions, nor did they know what 
condition would follow the initial one, so there should be no “end game” effects,
11 and 
initial interactions under a given condition (for example, S interactions of the S-SP and of 
the S-CSP designs) are experimentally identical. 
With respect to theoretical predictions, consider first the standard assumptions 
that subjects are 1) concerned only with their own payoffs, 2) not guided by values and 
ethical concerns, 3) rational, and 4) assume that their counterparts in the experiment are 
like them in these respects, serve as a useful analytical benchmark. Under these 
assumptions and assuming interactions of given pairs are not repeated and that 
informational conditions make it impossible to invest in reputation, B should send no 
money to A regardless of how much he receives, and understanding this A should send 
nothing to B.  A and B thus each keep their initial endowments and earn E$10 from an 
interaction without a contract.  Under these assumptions, it also follows that (a) ability to 
make proposals, no matter how many, (b) concurring on the same proposal, and (c) 
exchanging text messages, would make no difference.   
An alternative to conventional economic theory is provided by behavioral 
economics. Although neither theoretical nor experimental behavioral economics provide 
as specific a set of predictions as does conventional theory, they do supply observations 
that permit characterization of trusting and trustworthiness. These may be listed as: (a) 
people often display trust and trustworthiness in real-life interactions resembling trust 
                                                 
11 “End game” effects should in any case be ruled out since each interaction has a different partner, but 
subjects nevertheless react differently in a known last interaction, in some experiments.   12
games, and large numbers have done so as well in past experimental trust games;
12 (b) 
communication is helpful in engendering cooperation (as discussed above); (c) 
reciprocity is often observed (that is, many people act as if  obligated to return kindness 
to someone who acts in a kind or trusting fashion toward them);
13 (d) many people have a 
preference for keeping their word;
14 (e) there exist individual differences that generate a 
distribution of types in terms of money-maximizing versus other preferences;
15 and (f) 
individuals choose their actions to maximize their utility (inclusive of any non-money 
preferences) subject to beliefs about partners’ types, which may be influenced by 
information about partner characteristics or past actions. Based on these observations, we 
expect that: 
•  as in past trust game experiments, there will be considerable amounts of sending 
and returning even in interactions without pre-play communication;   
•  the amounts sent and returned will be greater when partners can engage in pre-
play communication, and more so if that communication includes written 
messages, not only because of the way in which this aids coordination, signaling 
and screening of types, but also because with text messages especially individuals 
can sometimes build a sense of trust in and responsibility toward their partners, 
and because the exchange of promises will make many feel bound to keep their 
word; 
•  trustors (A) will send more when trustees (B) have concurred on a proposal, 
because they will interpret this as an agreement to which B may feel some degree 
of commitment; 
•  subjects will tend to adhere to agreements, especially ones reached verbally and 
with explicit promises or assurances; 
                                                 
12 See the summary in Camerer (2003) and the symposium in  Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization, vol. 55, no. 4, 2004. 
13 References to the literature on reciprocity include Hoffman, McCabe and Smith (1998), Fehr and 
Gächter, (2000b), Ben-Ner and Putterman (2000) and Gintis, Bowles, Boyd and Fehr, eds. (2005), among 
many other contributions. 
14 Gneezy (2005), Sánchez-Pagés and Vorsatz (2004), Charness and Dufwenberg (2006). 
15 Kurzban and Houser (2001), Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001), Page, Putterman and Unel (2005).     13
•  subjects will show special interest in proposals that achieve both efficiency and 
equity, i.e., A sends E$10 and B returns 2/3 of the amount received (or (Xa, Xb) = 
(E$10,E$20)) for payoffs (E$20,E$20). 
  
  Behavioral approaches do not assume that all individuals are equally trusting and 
trustworthy.  Strategic behaviors by more opportunistic individuals attempting to exploit 
more trusting or trustworthy individuals are entirely possible.  One interesting point 
worth making, in this regard, is that if A believes that B is trustworthy and A’s aim is to 
maximize her payoff, A might consider proposing Xa = E$10, Xb = E$25, which gives 
payoffs (E$25, E$15), making the exchange worthwhile for B but still moreso for A.  
However, even an opportunistic A might hesitate to suggest this if concerned that, by 
undermining B’s “good will” or sense of obligation to reciprocate, the clearly self-
interested maneuver would significantly reduce the likelihood that B will follow through.  
We therefore conjecture that 
•  rather than make the proposal which maximizes her prospective earnings 
assuming trustworthiness of B and subject to B receiving some benefit, A will tend 
to make the (Xa, Xb) = (E$10,E$20) proposal, to increase the likelihood of her 
counterpart agreeing and implementing it. 
  
The hypotheses generated by standard and behavioral economics thus disagree on 
most predictions. Whereas standard theory predicts (Xa,Xb) = (0,0) in all interactions, 
with no effect of communication, behavioral reasoning predicts some positive sending 
and returning in simple interactions, the presence of efficient and fair (E$10,E$20) 




  Nine sessions with twelve to eighteen subjects in each role (the number always 
matching in a given session) were conducted in computer classrooms at the University of 
Minnesota, with a total of 264 subjects drawn from the general undergraduate and 
graduate student body of the university.  Table 1 shows the number of sessions and   14
subjects by treatment.  The total number of interactions to be analyzed should ideally be 
1320 (½*10*264) but is slightly smaller due to the fact that computer break-downs left a 
few interactions uncompleted.  We begin by analyzing the first five interactions, when 




4.a The pure effect of communication on sending and returning: inter-subject comparison 
in rounds 1 - 5  
  Figure 2 gives a picture of trusting behaviors during the first five rounds of play, 
when subjects had experienced one condition (S or SP or CSP) only.  For each round, 
Figure 2 has a left bar showing the distribution of amounts sent by subjects in role A in 
the S condition, a middle bar showing the corresponding information for A’s in SP 
condition, and a right bar showing that distribution for A’s in CSP condition.  The fact 
that the proportion sending 10 (the lower portion of the bar) is always increasing from S 
to SP and from SP to CSP suggests that trusting was indeed greater with more pre-play 
communication. 
  Figure 3 parallels Figure 2 but shows the distribution of the proportion returned 
by subjects in the B role who were sent a positive amount by the person they were paired 
with.  As with Figure 2, the availability of pre-play communication increases from left to 
right of each set of three bars.  It’s immediately apparent that the proportion of subjects 
who returned 67% or more of the money they received—that is, enough to make their 
counterpart at least as well off as themselves—increases in every period as one goes from 
S to SP and from SP to CSP condition.  The prediction that trustworthiness is enhanced 
by communication thus appears to be supported. 
  Before verifying these conclusions formally, it’s worth remarking that both trust 
and trustworthiness levels are relatively high in our experiment as compared to many in 
the literature.  For example, in BDM’s no history treatment, A’s sent an average of $5.16, 
with 15.6% sending their entire endowment, and B’s who received positive amounts 
                                                 
16 Instructions and sample screens are available for viewing at 
https://netfiles.umn.edu/users/benne001/www/papers/Instructions&ScreensAprJun06.pdf  .  This document 
begins with the written instruction sheet that subjects saw first, then moves to on-screen general 
instructions and instructions for specific types of interactions, and includes illustrations of the screens the 
subjects in each role saw during the course of an interaction.   15
returned an average of 29.8% of what they received, with 20% returning nothing, 10% 
returning half to 2/3, and 16.7% returning 2/3 (the amount necessary to give A and B 
equal payoffs) or more.  In a more-or-less identical treatment reported by Andreoni 
(2005), the numbers are similar: average sending of 45% of endowment, and average 
returning of 26.7% of the amount received, with only 13% of senders receiving back even 
half of the tripled amount.
17  In the first simple trust interaction in our experiment, in 
contrast, A’s sent an average of E$6.36 or 63.6% of their endowment, with 33.9% 
sending their entire endowment, and B’s who received positive amounts returned an 
average of 43.4%, with 14.8% returning nothing, the same number returning half, and 
40.7% returning 2/3 or more.
18  Since the subjects in both our own experiment and BDM 
were students at the University of Minnesota, differences are unlikely to be attributable to 
the subject pool (unless the different decades matter) and must be due to other factors, 
such as the use of computers rather than physical passing of dollars in our experiment, the 
lower stakes per interaction, and the use of the interaction table making transparent the 
implications of each choice.  We consider the high levels of sending and returning in our 
subject population relative to others again, below, when we consider the high number of 
“fair and efficient” interactions. 
  Returning to the differences by condition, consider now the summary information 
in Table 2 and the statistical tests in Table 3.  For the tests, we average the behavior of a 
given subject A or B over the five periods in question and treat it as a single observation 
so as to avoid the problem of interdependence of observations.
19  In the five rounds 
considered, subjects had knowledge and experience under one condition only—either S, 
or SP, or CSP.  Since the subjects were not told what condition would follow, the first 
five interactions in treatments S-SP and S-CSP occurred under identical conditions and 
                                                 
17 The proportion receiving back 2/3 is not reported. 
18 Subjects in Glaeser et al.’s trust game send a slightly higher amount and also have high return rates, but 
their experiment is not easily compared with others because (a) there is no anonymity between trustors and 
trustees, (b)  trustees receive no endowment, increasing the likelihood of confounding trust with altruism, 
(c) money sent by trustors is doubled, not tripled, and (d) some trustees can make non-binding promises to 
return at least half.  Interestingly, selecting the promise statement didn’t change the average proportion 
returned, but it concentrated the distribution of proportions returned on the one-half share, thus reducing the 
fraction of trustees leaving their partner worse off. 
19 For subjects in the B role, we investigate here only decisions made in those cases in which their 
counterpart sent a positive amount, since B can return nothing if A sends nothing.  If, for example, a given 
B received a positive amount in four of five interactions, the fraction returned is averaged over those four 
interactions only.  As Figure 2 shows, the percentage of interactions in which A sent 0 is small.    16
so are pooled for analysis, as are the first five interactions in treatments SP-S and SP-
CSP.  The shaded upper portion of Table 2 and the shaded upper left portions of Tables 
3a and 3b show that (a) the average and median amount sent by A’s was higher in CSP 
than in SP interactions and higher in SP than in S interactions during those five initial 
interactions, (b) the average and median proportion of received money returned by B’s 
was larger in CSP than in SP and larger in SP than in S interactions during the same five 
interactions, and (c) all of these differences, except for the difference of A’s sending in 
SP vs. S, are statistically significant in one-tailed Mann-Whitney tests.
20  These inter-
subject comparisons of decisions under conditions “uncontaminated” by other forms of 
interaction represent our first important finding. 
  We are also interested in the frequency with which subjects reached and kept 
agreements, to see whether this differs by treatment.  Recall that efficiency is greater 
when A’s send more to their partners, regardless of the equality or otherwise of the final 
outcome, which is determined by their partners’ responses.  An interesting question is 
whether verbal communication increases trusting in part because it makes it easier to 
reach agreement.  The data suggest that this was so.  When the first interaction was under 
the CSP condition, agreement on a course of action was reached 82% of the time, 
whereas in the SP condition, agreement was reached in the first interaction only 55% of 
the time, a difference significant at the 1% level.  The proportion of communications 
ending in agreement is higher under CSP than under SP in periods 2, 3, 4 and 5 as well.
21  
For rounds 1 to 5 as a whole, agreement was reached in 60% of SP interactions versus 
79% of CSP interactions, and the difference is significant at the 1% level. 
  Finally, the benefits of pre-play communication can be viewed in terms of two 
dimensions.  On the one hand, the efficiency of an interaction, increasing as the 
combined earnings of A and B go from E$20 to E$40, depends only on A’s trusting.  On 
the other hand, the equity of the interaction’s outcome, which can be measured by the 
ratio of earnings of B to earnings of A, depends mainly on the share that B returns, or B’s 
                                                 
20 Differences between both A’s sending and B’s fraction returned in the CSP vs. SP conditions are 
significant at the 5% level.  The difference between B’s fraction returned in the SP vs. S condition is 
significant at the 10% level.  The differences between both A’s sending and B’s fraction returned in the 
CSP vs. S conditions are significant at the 1% level. 
21 The comparison is between SP interactions in the pooled SP-S and SP-CSP treatments, and CSP 
interactions in the CSP-S treatment.  The difference is significant at the 1% level in round 3 and at the 10% 
level in rounds 4 and 5, but is not significant in round 2.   17
trustworthiness.
22  In Figures 4 and 5, we display for rounds 1 – 5 the average total 
earnings and the average ratio of earnings, by condition.   
  Beginning from the left side of Figure 4, we see that already in the S condition, 
combined earnings are over E$35, thus achieving more than 75% of the potential 
efficiency gain from trust.  The next two points show average combined earnings in the 
SP condition, first for interactions without numerical agreement on a proposal (denoted 
w/o NA), then for those with agreement (i.e., w/ NA)—where NA means that the row and 
column selected by A in pre-play communication is likewise selected by B.  Earnings are 
substantially higher in SP than in S if agreement is reached, but are lower if it is not, the 
A’s then being even less confident about sending money than in a game with no 
communication.  In the fourth and fifth points, the same pattern is repeated by CSP 
interactions without and with numerical agreement, but efficiency is somewhat higher for 
CSP than for SP interactions when there is a numerical agreement.  The final point shows 
average earnings in CSP interactions in which agreement was reached both verbally and 
numerically (with verbal agreement being denoted by VA).
23  Here, efficiency is 
remarkably close to the 100% level achieved when all trustors send their full 
endowments. 
  Turning to the ratio of B to A earnings, which reflects mainly the return rate or 
trustworthiness of B’s, Figure 5 shows a steady decline as we move toward conditions 
allowing greater pre-play communication.  On average, B’s return more of what A’s send 
them when they have exchanged numerical proposals, in the SP condition, and more still 
when they’ve also exchanged text messages, in the CSP condition.  Although the share 
returned by B’s is higher in interactions with agreement than in those without, the ratio of 
B to A earnings doesn’t decline between the SP without agreement and the SP with 
                                                 
22  More precisely, if A sends 0, B has no decision to make and the earnings ratio is 1.  If A sends 1, the ratio 
can range from 13/9, if B returns nothing, to 10/12, if B returns everything.  And if A sends 10, the ratio 
can range from 40/0 Æ ∞, if B returns nothing, to 10/30 = 1/3, if B returns everything.  Thus, the more A 
sends, the steeper is the curve relating B’s to A’s earnings, with B’s choice set then corresponding to a 
broader set of earnings ratios. 
23 Note that whether VA occurs is judged by analyzing the text of chat exchanges.  We say VA occurs if 
there’s an identifiable verbal agreement the terms of which match the row and column selections of both A 
and B in the numerical communication stage of the same round.  Row and column numbers per se need not 
have been mentioned in the chat exchange; for example, A writing “I send 10, you return 20” and B writing 
“o.k.” is treated as an agreement on the send 10 row and the  return 67% column, if confirmed by matching 
numerical choices.     18
agreement points, because observations in which A sends nothing are associated with an 
equal earnings ratio.
24   In contrast to the two points for SP, the higher proportion of A’s 
who send all or most of their endowment allows greater trustworthiness by B’s to lower 
earnings disparity for CSP interactions with agreement relative to those without 
agreement.  Even those CSP interactions in which no agreement was reached have lower 
average inequality than S and SP interactions.  Finally, the CSP interactions with both 
verbal and numerical agreement display the highest equality of earnings.  The general 
trend of Figures 4 and 5, looked at together, is therefore that both efficiency and equality 
are increased by pre-play communication, especially when agreement is achieved (as it is 
more often the better the quality of communication that is available). 
 
4.b  More communication effects: inter- and intra-subject comparisons, all rounds 
  Figures 6 and 7 parallel Figures 2 and 3 but show the shares of each behavior 
displayed during rounds 6 – 10 rather than 1 – 5.  These figures, along with Table 2, 
suggest that in rounds 6 – 10 A’s again sent more and B’s again returned a higher fraction 
of what they received under the CSP condition than under either SP or S.    Tables 3a and 
3b confirm that the differences between CSP and SP and between CSP and S in rounds 6 
– 10 are significant at the 1% level. 
  In contrast with these first results, the relationships between sending and returning 
in S and SP are clearly not the same in rounds 6 – 10 as in rounds 1 – 5.  Unlike the 
earlier rounds, sending and returning are actually a little higher, on average, in S than in 
SP, during rounds 6 – 10.  But these differences are not significant.   
  Part of the explanation for why the comparison in rounds 6 – 10 no longer favors 
SP over S may lies in the fact that the S interactions of rounds 6 – 10 followed five 
rounds with either SP or CSP communication, and that these experiences appear to have 
had lasting effects on trust and trustworthiness. Sending by A’s in rounds 6 – 10 of the 
SP-S treatment (average 7.79) and in the same rounds of the CSP-S treatment (average 
8.09) exceeds that in S interactions of the S-SP and S-CSP treatments (average 7.34), and 
Table 3 indicates that the difference in the case of CSP-S versus S-SP and S-CSP is 
                                                 
24 This fact also constrains the height of the point for the S interactions, in the figure, making the steep 
decline displayed all the more remarkable.   19
significant at the 1% level.
25  Much the same is true of proportion returned by B, which 
averages 47.3% in the S interactions of the SP-S treatment and 48.4% in those of the 
CSP-S treatment versus 42.5% in initial interactions of the S-SP and S-CSP treatments.  
According to Table 3b, the difference in proportion returned in S interactions of CSP-S 
and in those of S-SP and S-CSP is significant at the 10% level.  It thus appears that 
subjects interacting without communication were more trusting and trustworthy after 
experiencing interactions with communication.   
  However, increased trusting and trustworthiness in simple interactions that follow 
after interactions with communication is not by itself enough to explain the unexpected 
performance of S versus SP in rounds 6 – 10; in particular, it leaves unexplained why 
subjects in the SP condition of the S-SP treatment were not themselves more trusting and 
trustworthy.  It appears that those subjects’ five rounds of experience under the S 
condition were not as favorable to trusting and trustworthiness as were initial rounds 
under SP and CSP, but a complete explanation is impossible on the basis of these 
treatments alone.
26 
  A major reason for including the second block of interactions under different 
conditions was to permit intra-subject comparisons to complement the inter-subject 
comparisons of section 4.a.  As in the inter-subject comparisons just reported, the data 
provide the most straightforward conclusions in the case of the comparisons involving S 
and CSP.  Regardless of order (S-CSP or CSP-S), A’s sent more and B’s returned a 
higher fraction under CSP interactions than in ones under S.  These differences are 
significant at the 1% level in one-tailed Wilcoxon matched pair (signed-rank) tests, 
except that when S follows CSP, the fall in trusting by A is not significant—an exception 
that follows from the “lasting effect” observation of the previous paragraphs.
27  In the 
treatment permitting intra-subject comparison between SP and CSP, run in one order 
only, sending is significantly higher (p < .05) in CSP but there is no significant difference 
in proportion returned. In the two treatments involving SP and S, there is mild support for 
the proposition that trustworthiness is higher with pre-play communication, in that the 
                                                 
25 See the fourth and fifth cells of the first row of Table 3. 
26 We plan to explore in detail the influence of experience in prior interactions on the behavior of our 
subjects in another paper. 
27 The tests use individual observations averaged over 5 periods.   20
proportion returned is higher under SP regardless of order; but the difference is 
significant (at 5%) only when SP comes second.  As to the behavior of A’s, sending is 
greater in SP if it follows S, but this difference is not significant.  Moreover, the opposite 
relationship holds when S follows SP, and in that case the difference is significant at the 
5% level.  The conclusions based on inter-subject comparison in rounds 1 – 5—that trust 
and trustworthiness rise as one passes from S to SP and from SP to CSP—are thus 
supported unambiguously in the intra-subject comparisons for S versus CSP, only.     
  Our data permit some controlled inter-subject comparisons in rounds 6 – 10, and 
these produce more evidence that trusting and trustworthiness are higher in CSP than in 
the other two treatments.  Specifically, behaviors in rounds 6 – 10 of the S-SP and S-CSP 
treatments let us compare choices under SP versus CSP communication following the 
same prior experience of five interactions without communication.  A’s send an average 
of E$9.85 in CSP of S-CSP versus E$7.76 in SP of S-SP.  B’s who receive positive 
amounts return an average of 59.2% in CSP of S-CSP and an average of 47.6% in SP of 
S-SP.  Hence, in rounds 6 – 10, as in rounds 1 – 5, both trusting and trustworthiness are 
greater in CSP than in SP after identical experience—here, the experience of 5 
interactions without communication.  Both differences are significant at the 1% level (not 
shown in Table 3a or 3b).    
  A second such comparison, this time between S and CSP behaviors, is offered by 
the SP-S and SP-CSP treatments.  A’s send an average of E$9.19 in rounds 6 – 10 of SP-
CSP versus E$7.79 in rounds 6 – 10 of SP-S, and B’s return an average of 49.2% in CSP 
interactions of SP-CSP versus 47.3% in S interactions of SP-S.  Thus, after five 
interactions under SP, subjects are more trusting and more trustworthy when their next 
interactions allow chat and numerical proposals (CSP) than when they allow no 
communication (S), a difference that is again consistent with the result for interactions 1 
– 5 discussed in section 4.a.  The difference of A’s sending is significant at the 5% level, 
but the difference in B’s returning is not significant (not shown in Table 3a or 3b).   
  The overall effect of communication in our experiment is summarized visually in 
Figure 8, which shows the proportion of round 1 – 10 interactions overall, by condition, 
in which A’s sent each possible amount (Figure 8a) and in which B’s who received 
something returned each possible proportion (figure 8b). Mann-Whitney tests find that   21
sending and proportion returned are significantly higher overall in CSP than in S and SP 
(p<0.01 in both cases). Sending is slightly higher but proportion returned is slightly lower 
overall in S than in SP, and the differences between these two treatments are not 
statistically significant. 
 
4.c The effect of communication on fulfillment of agreements 
  As we’ve argued, parting with promised money when an agreement has been 
made is a clearer demonstration of trust and trustworthiness than sending and receiving in 
the traditional trust game, which are subject to varying interpretations.  In the SP and 
CSP conditions of our experiment, in which subjects had the opportunity to reach non-
binding pre-play agreements either by exchange of numerical proposals or by exchanging 
words and numerical proposals, the large majority of subjects lived up to those 
agreements.  In rounds 1 – 5 (6 – 10), A’s sent what they agreed to 89% (91%)of the time 
in SP condition and 99% (98%) of the time in CSP condition; and given such compliance 
by their counterpart, B’s sent the proportion they had agreed to send 74% (70%) of the 
time in SP and 84% (85%) of the time in CSP.  For all interactions combined, the 
relevant figures are 82% in SP and 99% in CSP, for A’s, and 72% in SP and 85% in 
CSP, for B’s.  Our prediction that subjects would adhere to non-binding agreements more 
often when these were reached by exchange of words is thus supported, with the 
differences between adherence rates in SP versus CSP for A’s being significant at the 1% 
level for all rounds, and the difference for B’s being significant at the 5% rate for rounds 
1 – 5 and at the 1% rate for periods 6 – 10 and 1 – 10.  
  A major reason why agreements reached with words are more likely to be adhered 
to than those reached with numbers only is that our protocol for exchanging numerical 
proposals does not allow subjects to express intention or commitment.  Among CSP 
interactions in which agreement on a proposal is indicated in the numerical exchange part 
of the communication are 272 cases in which the terms were first agreed to verbally then 
numerically, and 68 cases in which there was no explicit verbal agreement before the 
numerical one.  We find that in 4.4% of cases A’s violated an agreement made 
numerically only, in CSP, whereas there was a 0.7% violation rate for agreements that 
were first made verbally, a difference significant at the 1% level in a 1-tailed Mann-  22
Whitney test.   Given fulfillment by A, B’s violated an agreement made numerically only 
in 21.5% of cases, in CSP, whereas there was a 13.3% violation rate for agreements that 
were first made verbally.  Thus both trusting and trustworthiness in the sense of adhering 
to agreements are significantly higher when the agreement was first made verbally, with 
the difference for B’s being significant at the 5% level in a 1-tailed Mann-Whitney test.   
 
  Figure 9 displays visually the pattern of violation of agreements in the SP and 
CSP interactions.  The upper line, graphing the percent of agreements violated by B’s, 
shows the substantially higher violation rate in SP interactions with numerical agreement 
than in CSP interactions in which only numerical agreement is achieved, and the still 
lower violation rate in CSP interactions with both verbal and numerical agreement.  The 
lower line shows the corresponding pattern for A’s, which differs slightly in that there are 
slightly more violations by A’s in the CSP interactions with both types of agreement.  But 
the fraction of violations is in both cases very small, between one half and one percent of 
agreements only, so the slight reversal is inconsequential.   
  We defer to the end of the next section a regression analysis of the determinants 
of violating agreements. 
 
4.d  Effects of agreement and assurances in text communication 
  Although there is overwhelming evidence in our data that non-binding pre-play 
communication that included a text component significantly increased the sending and 
returning of money, determining what about such communication led to these effects is 
difficult.  Some of the effect could be due to a reduction of social distance or to the 
“rendering real” of the unknown counterpart, effects that could be relatively independent 
of communication’s specific contents.  On the other hand, such outcomes might require a 
certain amount of “chit chat” or exposure of some facet of personality, and outcomes 
might also depend on quite specific message contents, such as whether B explicitly 
promises to uphold an agreement, or whether A asks B for assurances.  In this section, we 
offer a partial investigation of how the specific contents of verbal communication and the 
action of agreeing to a numerical proposal affected outcomes, keeping in mind that no set 
of words exchanged should affect behaviors under an assumption of strict rationality,   23
payoff-maximizing preferences, and common knowledge.  We studied the chat log of 
each CSP interaction and coded the following variables: 
 
A,B Agree: Did A and B agree verbally on a specific course of action (row, column)?
28   
0 = no, 1 = yes 
 
A Inquires: Did A try to learn something about B by asking questions or initiating or 
attempting to extend non-task-related conversation    
0 = no, 1 = yes, but cursory, 2 = yes, and substantive
29 
 
B Assures: Did B offer assurances about his trustworthiness, such as “you have my 
word,” “you can count on me,” etc.   
0 = no, 1 = yes 
 
Non-Task Talk: Did A and B communicate about matters unrelated to their decision   
0 = no, 1 = yes 
 
  Table 4 shows six GLS regressions, each with subject fixed effects, period and 
period squared, the four coded variables, and condition/treatment dummy variables.
30 
Only interactions under CSP condition are included.  Regressions (1) and (2), which 
attempt to explain the amount sent by A, differ only by inclusion of a Numerical 
Agreement (NA) control in (2).  This dummy variable is 1 if B’s numerical proposal 
matched A’s, 0 otherwise (recall that A knew B’s proposal choice before making his 
binding decision).  In column (1), only A, B Agree has a significant coefficient, 
suggesting that after controlling for other factors, A sent about E$1.87 more if A and B 
had reached an agreement by way of chat.  To see whether agreeing on the course of 
action verbally has effects over and above those of agreeing numerically, we include both 
the numerical agreement variable NA and the verbal agreement variable A, B Agree in 
                                                 
28 The condition A, B Agree = 1 is identical to that of presence of a VA or verbal agreement in section 4.a 
and Figures 4 and 5.  Note that A, B Agree = 0 does not imply that there was disagreement between the pair 
of subjects.  They may simply not have discussed specific terms, or they may have agreed on terms that 
don’t match the exchange of numerical messages of that round. 
29 Although this item is inclusive of whether A asked B for assurances, a matter we mention above, we 
decided not to limit it because there were very few such explicit requests, but a variety of inquiries about B 
might be interpreted as attempts to probe B’s type or “character.” 
30 We code “period” as 1 for the first interaction under a condition, even if that interaction occurs in the 6
th 
round of the session (for example, the first CSP round of the S-CSP treatment).  In this case, round 7 would 
be period 2, and so on.   24
regression (2).
31 The result indicates that each of the two, numerical and verbal 
agreement, significantly increased A’s sending.  None of the other message content 
variables have significant coefficients.    
  Regressions (3) and (4) investigate the effects of communication content on the 
proportion returned by B assuming A sent a positive amount.  That amount is included as 
a control (A’s sending), anticipating its strong effect and thus the need to control for it in 
order to correctly capture other effects.  Perhaps surprisingly, A, B Agree shows no effect 
here, the coefficients being negative and insignificant.  NA is also insignificant, in 
regression (4), although positive.  In both regressions, the amount sent by A is a highly 
significant determinant of not only the amount but also the proportion B returns, 
suggesting that displaying more trust brings out more trustworthiness in the counterpart.
32  
In both regressions, there is a positive coefficient, significant at the 10% level, on the 
variable B Assures, indicating that those subjects B who offered explicit verbal 
assurances to their counterparts tended to return about 7% more of the amount they 
received back to their partners, all else being equal.  None of the other message content 
variables have significant coefficients.  The coefficients of the trend terms are significant, 
implying a small decline in the proportion returned from the first to the third interaction 
followed by a small recovery in the fourth and fifth interactions.  There are significant 
condition/treatment dummies, indicating lower proportions returned in the two treatments 
in which CSP came in the second block of rounds, after controlling for amount sent.   
  It is also informative to look at what proportion B returned in light of what A 
proposed, especially when B may or may not have concurred with the proposal.  We do 
this in regressions (5) and (6), in which the difference between the proportion proposed 
by A (and possibly agreed to by B) and the actual proportion returned by B, “B 
‘shortfall’,” is the dependent variable. In this case, A, B Agree has a significant negative 
                                                 
31 We coded “A, B Agree” as 1 only if we could verify that what the two subjects appeared to agree on in 
their verbal messages matched the exchange of numerical proposals that immediately followed.  “A, B 
Agree” thus implies NA.  The reverse doesn’t hold, however, because even though A and B did not reach 
agreement on a specific course of action in their verbal messages, B could nevertheless select the same 
proposal as had A in their numerical exchange. 
32 Being treated as if one possessed an esteemed trait, trustworthiness, may induce an individual to attempt 
to act accordingly, whereas being treated with suspicion by being sent a small amount only may have the 
opposite effect.  Although Schotter and Sopher (2006) conclude that trust does not lead to trustworthiness, 
their conclusion is based on inter-temporal comparisons rather than cross-sectional analysis.   25
coefficient when there is no control for numerical agreement, NA, but in regression (6), 
to which that variable is added, the effect of verbal agreement becomes insignificant and 
it is NA that instead seems to cause B’s closer adherence to the proposal.
33  In these 
regressions, B Assures is no longer significant.  No other coded message content variable 
is significant, either, and the significant coefficients on the trend variables indicate that B 
increasingly strayed from the proposed return proportion during periods 1 to 4 before 
coming slightly closer to the proposal again. 
  Regressions (5) and (6) suggest that there is something about B’s giving assent to 
A’s proposal, whether in words or by the clicking of rows and columns, that is associated 
with greater adherence to the proposal’s terms by B.  One possibility is that B’s preferred 
choice simply happened to correlate with the proposal and that B honestly revealed this in 
words or clicks.  Another is that, in contemplating what to do, a majority of B’s took into 
account that once they had given their assent, they would feel bound to abide by the 
agreement.  On this interpretation, most subjects, when placed in the role of B, were 
capable of self-committing to an agreement, at least one involving stakes of not more 
than $2 in real money per interaction.  The strong effects of “A, B agree” and NA in 
regressions (1) and (2) can also, by this interpretation, be read as signs that most subjects 
placed in the A role tended to believe most B’s to be capable of such self-commitment.  
  We also estimated sets of regressions to investigate the determinants of 
agreements being violated by A or B players.  Table 5a displays a set of random effects 
probit regressions for SP and CSP interactions in which a numerical agreement was 
reached.
 34  The dependent variable is 1 if A fails to send the amount specified, otherwise 
0. The left block includes only interactions of rounds 1 – 5, the middle block those of 
rounds 6 -10, and the right block those of all ten rounds.  All specifications include trend 
terms (period and period squared
35) which obtain no significant coefficients.  When the 
amount that A proposed to send is included among the explanatory variables, in the 2
nd 
and 4
th specifications of each block, it obtains a significant negative coefficient with an 
                                                 
33 We also estimated versions of (5) and (6) that include the A’s sending variable among the regressors.  
Results are qualitatively quite similar, with A’s sending negative but significant only at the 10% level in the 
equation corresponding to (5) and insignificant in the version corresponding to (6). The significant 
coefficient on CSP in SP-CSP becomes negative and insignificant. 
34 The attempt to estimate these regressions using subject fixed effect terms failed, evidently due to the near 
absence of variation with respect to violating or not violating agreements for a given subject. 
35 As with previous regressions, round 6 is numbered period 1, and so on.   26
interesting implication: A’s who proposed to send less  were more, not less, likely to 
default on an agreement.  Evidently, a low proposal is usually made by a less trusting A, 
and individuals in such a state of mind were more likely than others to “chicken out.”  
When a dummy variable for CSP interactions is added, as in the 3
rd and 4
th specifications 
of each block, it obtains a negative coefficient, usually significant, indicating that pre-
play chat made trustors much less likely to default on any agreement reached.    
  The pattern of violations by B’s, which were much more common, is analyzed in 
Table 5b with essentially the same set of specifications, except that B’s proposed column 
is substituted for A’s proposed row.  As before, the trend terms do not obtain significant 
coefficients. The coefficients on column proposal are positive and, for rounds 1 – 10 as a 
whole, significant: the higher the proportion B was to return, the more likely was B to 
default.  Finally, the dummy variable for CSP interactions is negative and is significant in 
rounds 6 – 10 and 1 – 10 as a whole, indicating that agreements were significantly more 
likely to be fulfilled by B’s when they were preceded by pre-play chat.
36   
 
4.e.  An attraction to “fair and efficient” exchanges 
We call an interaction or proposal “fair and efficient” (F&E) if it involves the pair 
of actions (Xa, Xb) = (E$10,E$20), since this leads to the most equal division of the 
largest sum of earnings.  In those exchanges in which proposals were possible (SP and 
CSP), A’s proposal was fair and efficient 62.9% of the time in SP and 78.8% of the time 
in CSP.  Such proposals were agreed to by B when made by A 76.4% of the time in SP 
and 97.4% of the time in CSP (the latter often reflecting verbal agreement in the 
immediately preceding exchange of numerical messages).
37  In both comparisons, the 
difference between SP and CSP is significant at the 1% level in a one-tailed Mann-
Whitney test.  Once such a proposal was agreed on, A’s fulfilled their part by sending 
E$10 94.2% of the time in SP and 98.7% of the time in CSP.  The counterpart B’s of 
these trusting A’s then returned the promised amount 67.1% of the time in SP, 85.1% of 
                                                 
36 We also tried to estimate regressions for CSP interactions only to see whether pre-play verbal agreement 
made a difference to the violation rate.  But we were unable to obtain meaningful estimates given the 
regression method and the small number of observations and especially of violations. 
37 This analysis counts as proposals in the CSP treatment the row,column pair clicked on by A and that 
clicked on by B, not contents of the prior text messages.  The method of counting for the CSP and SP 
treatments are thus identical.    27
the time in CSP.
38  Both differences are significant at the 1% level in one-tailed Mann-
Whitney tests.  In the case of S interactions, where prior proposals were not possible, 
F&E interactions were nonetheless carried out 33.0%
39 of the time, versus a similar 
33.8% of completed F&E interactions in SP and a much larger 68.3% in CSP.  The 
difference between the S and SP conditions is small and insignificant, but the 
corresponding differences between the CSP and S and between the CSP and SP 
conditions are both significant at the 1% level.   
The fact that twice as large a share of interactions meet the F&E criterion when 
pre-play communication included words as when verbal exchange was unavailable is yet 
another indication of the power of verbal communication.  Also noteworthy is the fact 
that 85% of those B’s who agreed to do so proceeded to voluntarily forfeited the 
equivalent of $2.00 in fulfillment of each verbal agreement with an anonymous 
counterpart to an F&E interaction, which suggests substantial ability to self-commit in 
the presence of a fairness norm.  Finally, the fact that nearly 99% of the A’s concerned 
trusted their partners to do this and in most cases successfully doubled the value of the 
dollar they sent suggests a widespread belief that such behavior is common, at least 
among university students in Minnesota.  
The proportion of F&E outcomes in our experiment  differs dramatically from 
that seen in other trust experiments that adhere to the BDM design (i.e., two agents begin 
with equal endowments, A can send B an amount that is tripled, and B can send back any 
portion of that amount).  Of the 32 paired subjects in the original BDM treatment without 
history, only one interaction (3.1%) involved A sending 10 and B returning 20.
40    
Ortmann, Fitzgerald and Boeing (2000) report one set of 16 one-shot interactions 
identical to BDM, and find 13 senders of positive amounts, of whom only 2 received 
back twice or more than what they sent.  1 of the 2 sent 10 and got back 20, for a 6.3% 
rate of F&E interactions.  Cox (2004) reports 32 one-shot BDM-type interactions, in 
which just 4 of the 26 A’s who sent positive amounts (12.5% of all interactions, 15.4% of 
cases with positive sending) received back enough to earn as much or more than their 
                                                 
38 These percentages include a few cases (three in SP, one in CSP) in which B returned more than the 
promised 67%. 
39 This includes eight cases when B returned more than 67%. 
40 In five other cases, in which A sent less than 10, B returned 2/3 or more of the amount received—thus in 
only 20% of the cases of positive sending did A end up earning as much as or more than B.     28
counterparts.  3 of these 4 were A’s who sent 10, so there was a 9.4% rate of F&E 
interactions, overall.  Fehr and List (2004) allowed their trustors to make a non-binding 
suggestion of the amount to be returned at the time they sent money to a trustee, but only 
4 of their 63 undergraduate subjects and 5 of their 38 CEO subjects sent their entire 
endowment, and only one F&E exchange was completed, involving one of the CEO 
pairs.  Despite permitting trustors and trustees to get acquainted before interacting, 
Buchan et al. found that only one of 88 subjects in 4 different countries received back 
twice what they sent.  One of the few reported cases in which more than a third of B’s 
sent back enough to equalize earnings or make A’s better off is that of German subjects in 
Willinger, Keser, Lohmann and Usunier (2003), of whom 11 out of 29 senders (37.9%) 
received back at least twice as much as they sent.
41  It seems likely that a higher 
proportion of subjects in the B role sent back 2/3 or more of what they received, in our 
experiment, because of the clarity regarding this choice’s fairness imparted by the 
information display in our interaction table.  Trustees in other experiments who were 
informed of the same rules but who interacted without a table may have been more likely 
to think that returning half (rather than two thirds) is fair, failing to consider their 
endowment.  The multiple-interaction set-up of our experiment may also have 
encouraged experimentation with trusting by A’s, since no one decision determined a 
subject’s full earnings.  But it remains significant that what they learned through such 
experimentation was that trusting typically paid off given the behaviors of their 
counterparts, and that there was no fall off of either trusting or trustworthiness over time.   
The pull of the fair and efficient exchange is interesting from another standpoint.  
As mentioned in section 2, first mover A could propose a more advantageous exchange 
that would still benefit her counterpart, (Xa, Xb) = (E$10,E$25).   However, without an 
enforceable contract A might well worry that B would breach the agreement due to its 
lack of fairness.  This may help to explain why such proposals were observed so rarely in 
our experiment (4.3% of proposals in SP, 2.2% of proposals in CSP).
42  Further, in only 
one of the four cases in which B agreed to such a proposal and A sent the required E$10 
                                                 
41 The number of F&E interactions in our sense is not indicated, though we’re told that 13 of 29 senders of 
positive amounts sent their whole endowments.  Among Willinger et al.’s French subjects in the same 
treatment, 6 out of 29 positive senders received two or more times what they sent. 
42 Fehr and List’s (2004) CEO trustors often sent suggestions of returning more than 2/3, but theirs were 
only suggestions, with no agreement stage in the design.    29
did B return E$25, a 25% completion rate that contrasts sharply with the 67% to 85% 
completion rates for F&E agreements, reported above.  F&E proposals also dominated in 
an otherwise similar experiment (Ben-Ner and Putterman, 2007) in which subjects were 
given the opportunity to enter into binding contracts at a small cost. In that setting, 
standard theory clearly predicted that A would make and B would accept the (E$10, 
E$25) proposal, which would then be implemented in a binding contract. Yet it was 
almost never observed, while (E$10, E$20) was carried out in 33.8% of interactions with 
numerical communication and in 68.3% of those with chat plus numerical 
communication, proportions quite similar to those of the present experiment. Moreover, 
both A and B followed through on (E$10, E$20) proposals significantly more often than 
they did on others. 
 
5. Conclusions 
  In this paper we report the results of a series of trust experiments in which, in two 
of three conditions, subjects were able to exchange anonymously either non-binding 
numerical  (tabular) proposals or a minute’s worth of written messages followed by 
numerical proposals, after which they participated in the standard BDM (1995) trust 
game. We show that in the condition permitting both written and numerical messages 
(CSP), both trusting and trustworthiness are greater than in the experimental condition 
restricted to numerical communication only (SP) and in a no-communication baseline 
condition (S, played via computer using the same interaction table as in the other two 
conditions). The increase in trusting is substantial: trustors send on average E$9.21 as 
compared to E$7.66 without communication, the standard trust game, and to E$7.71 with 
one numerical exchange. Trustworthiness is also greater: trustees in the pre-play 
communication with numerical exchanges return on average 67% of the money they 
receive as compared to 50% without communication and 56% with only numerical 
communication.   
  Each of our 264 subjects participated in two types of interaction (S and SP, S and 
CSP, or SP and CSP), each one with a different counterpart seated in a different 
building, and we confirmed that order had no qualitative effect for the S/CSP 
comparison. While subjects displayed the most trusting and trustworthiness in the CSP   30
condition, both behaviors were also present in the other conditions. Thus, rather than 
ending up with the E$10 available to each party in the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium 
for rational payoff-maximizing subjects, trustors earned an average of E$16.55 in CSP, 
E$13.40 in S, and E$14.11 in SP, and trustees earned E$23.42 on average in CSP, 
E$26.51 in S, and E$25.56 in SP.
43   
  Of course, the earnings of B’s were higher in large part because some B’s were 
untrustworthy. Looking at those cases in the SP condition in which pre-play agreements 
were reached, we find that an average of 10% of the excess of trustee over trustor 
earnings can be attributed to the slight favoring of B’s in contract terms, while the 
remaining 90% is due to the violation of agreements. In the CSP condition, the 
corresponding proportions are 12.5% due to unequal agreement and 87.5% due to 
violation, when agreement was numerical only, and 11% due to unequal agreement and 
89% due to violation, when the agreement was both verbal and numerical.
44 
  Although we reserve most analysis of individual differences for another paper, we 
make one exception here, using the background data that our subjects provided in the 
prior sign-up survey to ask which subjects in the B role were likely to renege on their 
agreements?
45 We checked the scores on a much-used psychological measure of 
opportunism, the Machiavelli scale, of individuals who honored all agreements they 
entered versus those who failed to honor at least one agreement.
46 Consistent with 
expectations, the average score was higher, indicating more opportunism, among the 
defectors, significant at the 5% level.
47  Interestingly, there was no difference between the 
                                                 
43 The differences in both trustor and trustee earnings are not statistically significant for conditions S versus 
SP, but are significant at the 1% level for conditions S versus CSP and SP versus CSP.   Differences 
between trustor and trustee earnings under each condition are significant at the 1% level.  
44 These figures are derived by first calculating the final ratio of B to A earnings in those interactions with 
agreements in the condition in question, then calculating the corresponding ratio of earnings if all 
agreements had been implemented.  Let the first ratio be 1 + y and the second be 1 + x.  Then the share of 
the excess earnings of B’s attributable to agreement terms is x/y, and the share due to violation of 
agreements is (y – x)/y.  
45 There are very few violations of agreements by A (it is in A’s self-interest to keep the agreement if B can 
be trusted, and A cannot trap B by making an agreement that she will later violate), so we cannot analyze 
them statistically. 
46 The Mach-IV scale measures the subject’s level of agreement with 20 statements.  Christie & Geiss 
(1970) summarize early Machiavellianism research and describe the scale.  For an example of its use in 
economics, see Gunnthorsdottir, McCabe and Smith (2002). 
47 54 B’s made at least two agreements and never reneged, while 15 B’s reneged on at least one agreement.  
If we expand the first group by including B’s who never reneged but who made one or more agreements, an 
additional 9 subjects are added and the significance level of the difference falls to 10%.    31
two groups in terms of performance on a test of cognitive ability, the Wonderlic 
Personnel Test.   
    The most prominent difference between behavior in the CSP condition and in the 
S and SP conditions is the much higher percentage of interactions in which the trustor 
sent all his or her endowment to the trustee, and the trustee returned at least two-thirds of 
the amount he or she received (triple of what the trustor sent). This percentage is 30.0% 
in S, 33.8% in SP, and 68.3% in CSP. These interactions are “fair and efficient” – trustor 
and trustee end up with the same payoffs, and they maximize their joint take. From an 
examination of the record of verbal exchanges it turns out that 68.5% of trustor-trustee 
pairs made a verbal agreement about how to act in their binding interaction, and also 
confirmed that agreement in the non-binding numerical exchange stage. The vast 
majority of these specific agreements (93.38%) are to the “fair and efficient” exchange. 
“Fair and efficient” agreements are Pareto optimal but do not represent Nash equilibrium. 
Nonetheless, a remarkable 86.1% of the time subjects in the role of trustee carried out the 
formally non-binding agreement when their counterpart followed up their agreement by 
sending E$10 (99.21% of trustors did so).  Each time she honored a non-binding 
agreement with an anonymous partner whose identity she would never know, a trustor 
was giving up $2 of a maximum of $4 she could earn in that one of ten exchanges. Why 
did she do so, even in the last interaction with yet another randomly chosen counterpart?  
  An obvious possibility is that most subjects are inclined to keep their word, once 
given, at least when amounts of the sorts at stake here are on the table.  While sending by 
trustors is consistent with self-interest given observed trustee behaviors, amounts 
returned by the latter imply that most have either preferences that permit self-
commitment (for instance, disutility from lying, breaking their word, or letting down 
others’ expectations), a tendency towards reciprocity, fairness preferences, or more than 
one of these. Equally noteworthy is that trustor sending, even if self-interested, implies 
belief that many people have such preferences. Put differently, subjects in the trustor role 
work from assumptions about human nature that are at odds with conventional, non-
behavioral game theory and earn an extra 34 to 66% in the average transaction, as a 
result.  Because trustors find them trustworthy, trustees also earn more than in Nash 
equilibrium.   32
  A definitive explanation as to why text but not numerical communication elicits 
greater trusting and trustworthiness in our subjects is impossible to obtain without further 
research, but a reasonable conjecture is possible here as well. Our numerical proposal 
treatment gave subjects no chance to declare an interpretation of the numbers they sent – 
i.e., whether they were merely a proposal, a possibility being considered, or a behavior to 
which they would commit themselves. Text communication let subjects declare 
commitment, which was generally convincing to their counterparts and most often “self-
committing.”  The exchange may also have reassured subjects that their counterpart was a 
real person, not a programmed computer, and it may have imparted not just intellectual 
but also psycho-social “realness” to the counterpart, adding force to self-commitment. 
Our regressions showing that an express verbal pre-play agreement increased sending by 
trustors and adherence to the proposal by trustees, and that explicit expressions of 
assurance by trustees are associated with their returning a larger proportion, are 
consistent with these interpretations. 
  In a review of the literature on communication that the authors intentionally 
limited to the conventional approach, Farrell and Rabin (1996) wrote that “[f]or the 
purposes of this work, we’ll model ruthless economic [A] who tells the truth only 
whenever she finds it pays, and we’ll suppose that [B] expects that.”  They admit, 
however, that “[p]eople in reality do not seem to lie as much, or question each other’s 
statements as much, as game theory suggests they should.”  Referring to an experiment in 
which “subjects outperformed the … theoretical upper bound on gains from trade with 
private information” they commented “We interpret this, as well as the fact that people 
typically say what they want to have been believed even when the incentives clearly 
imply that cheap talk should not be believed, as suggesting that some people tell the truth 
despite incentives to lie (emphasis ours).”  It may have been an indication of the times 
that those statements appeared only in footnotes.  We believe that our results justify at 
least sometimes placing them in the text itself.  
   33
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Figure 1.  Interaction table 
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Note: B’s Return % reflects only instances when A sent more than zero.  39
Figure 4. Combined earnings of A and B , 























 Note: NA = numerical agreement, VA = verbal agreement. 
 
Figure 5. Ratio of B 's to A 's Earnings,


















   
Note: NA = numerical agreement, VA = verbal agreement.    40
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Figure 9. Percentage of agreement violated, 

























  Note: NA = numerical agreement, VA = verbal agreement.   43
Table 1.  Summary of treatments, sessions, and interactions 
 
Design Description  No.  of 
Sessions 
Total Participants  





5 simple interactions, 5 
interactions with one 
numerical proposal per 
subject 
2 48  232 
 
SP-S 
5 interactions with one 
numerical proposal per 
subject, 5 simple 
interactions 
2 50  241 
 
S-CSP 
5 simple interactions, 5 
interactions with chat 
plus one numerical 
proposal per subject 
2 64  309 
 
CSP-S 
5 interactions with chat 
plus one numerical 
proposal per subject, 5 
simple interactions 
2 68  335 
 
SP-CSP 
5 numerical proposal 
interactions, 5 with 
chat plus one numerical 
proposal per subject 
1 34  161 
 Notes: 1. Anonymous interactions.  2. No two subjects interacted twice.   44
Table 2.  Descriptive statistics of amount sent and % returned,  
by round and condition 
 






S  7.34 
(2.53) 
7.9  42.50 
(21.14) 
46.6 
SP  7.68 
(2.70) 




CSP  8.65 
(2.12) 
10  56.75 
(19.88) 
63.6 
All  7.96 
(2.83) 
10  47.96  
(21.18) 
54.63 
SP-S  7.79 
(2.27) 




CSP-S  8.09 
(3.21) 
10  48.38 
(20.42) 
56.23 
SP                 S-SP  7.76 
(2.02) 
7  47.58 
(20.26) 
55.67 
All  9.62 
(0.87) 
10  55.81  
(19.07) 
67 
S-CSP  9.85 
(0.42) 





SP-CSP  9.19 
(1.30) 
10  49.24 
(23.93) 
57.75 
















  * Excluding the cases when A sent zero. 
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Table 3a.  Mann-Whitney Tests of Amount Sent by A 
 
R1-R5 R6-R10   
S 
(S-SP &  
S-CSP) 
SP 















(S-SP &  
S-CSP) 
--  S < SP 
(NS) 
S < CSP 
(0.01) 
S < S 
(NS) 
S < S 
(0.01) 
S < SP 
(NS) 
S < CSP 
(0.01) 
S < CSP 
(0.01) 
SP 
(SP-S &  
SP-CSP) 
--  --  SP < CSP 
(0.05) 
 
SP < S 
(NS) 
SP < S 
(0.05) 
SP > SP 
(NS) 
SP < CSP 
(0.01) 
SP < CSP 
(0.05)  R1-R5 
CSP 
(CSP-S) 
--  --  --  --  CSP > S 
(NS) 
CSP > S 
(NS) 
CSP < CSP 
(0.01) 
 










-- --  --  --  -- 
S > SP 
(NS) 

















-- --  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
Notes: 1. SP > S means sending by A in the observations of condition SP is greater than sending by A in the observations of condition S, etc.   
2. The number in parenthesis is the significance level in a one-tailed Mann-Whitney test. 3. The average amount sent by each subject A during the 
first five interactions is treated as one observation.   46
Table 3b.  Mann-Whitney Tests of Percent Returned by B 
 
R1-R5 R6-R10   
S 
(S-SP &  
S-CSP) 
SP 















(S-SP &  
S-CSP) 
--  S < SP 
(0.10) 
S < CSP 
(0.01) 
 
S < S 
(NS) 
S < S 
(0.10) 
S < SP 
(NS) 
S < CSP 
(0.01) 
S < CSP 
(0.10) 
SP 
(SP-S &  
SP-CSP) 
--  --  SP < CSP 
(0.05) 
 
SP > S 
(NS) 
SP > S 
(NS) 
SP > SP 
(NS) 
SP < CSP 
(0.01) 
SP < CSP 




--  --  --  --  CSP > S 
(0.01) 
CSP > S 
(0.01) 
CSP < CSP 
(NS) 










-- --  --  --  -- 
S > SP 
(NS) 

















-- --  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
Notes: 1. SP > S means the proportion returned by B in the observations of condition SP is greater than the proportion returned by B in the 
observations of condition S, etc.  2. The number in parentheses is the significance level in a one-tailed Mann-Whitney test. 3. The average amount 
returned by each subject B during those of the first five interactions in which counterparts A sent a positive amount is treated as one observation.   47
Table 4. Determinants of A’s sending and B’s % return in CSP interactions, 
including coded verbal communication measures (GLS regressions) 
 




B’s return % 
(3) 






















































































































# observations  397  397  382  382  382  382 
Wald χ
2 216.32  426.49  109200.23  109343.53  110130.87  94935.78 
Prob. > χ
2 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Notes: 1. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors.  2. All estimates include individual fixed effects.  
3. regressions (3) – (6) include only the observations in which A sent more than zero. 4. The first four explanatory 
variables are coded from chat communication.  5. CSP in S-CSP and CSP in SP-CSP are dummy variables; CSP in 
CSP-S is the omitted category.  6. Round 6 = period 1, round 7 = period 2, etc. 7. Numerical Agreement = 1 if B and 
A chose same row and column, otherwise 0.  8.  *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 5a. Determinants of A’s violation of numerical agreement, pooled SP and CSP observations,  
by round (random effects probit regressions) 
 











































































                        
# observations  259  259  259  259  274  274  274  274  533  533  533  533 
Wald χ
2  0.16  3.89  5.06 8.24  2.20  7.23  5.06 8.82 1.30  10.49 10.19 16.77 
Prob. > χ
2 0.92  0.27  0.17  0.08  0.33  0.06  0.17  0.07  0.52  0.01  0.02  0.00 
Notes: 1. Dependent variable equals 1 if A sent less than agreed, 0 otherwise.  2. Only interactions with numerical agreement are included.  3. Round 6 = period 
1, round 7 = period 2, etc.  4. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  5. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5b. Determinants of B’s violation of numerical agreement, pooled SP and CSP observations,  
by round (random effects probit regressions) 
 
  Rounds 1-5  Rounds 6-10  Rounds 1-10 











































































                        
# observations  249  249  249  249  264  264  264  264  513  513  513  513 
Wald χ
2  1.65  1.30  2.94 2.72  2.83  3.44 6.78  7.61 4.70 8.08  11.41 15.30 
Prob. > χ
2 0.44  0.73  0.40  0.61  0.24  0.33  0.08  0.11  0.10  0.04  0.01  0.00 
Notes:  1. Dependent variable equals 1 if B sent less than agreed, 0 otherwise.  2. Only interactions with numerical agreement and in which A sent the amount 
agreed are included.  3. Round 6 = period 1, round 7 = period 2, etc.   4. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  4. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 